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Runet in Cr isis Situations1 
 
Gregory Asmolov2 
 
Abstract  
This chapter  suggests that the Russian Internet has two different, though inter related, 
faces. The fir st face is that of Runet in everyday life. The second is that of Runet in cr isis 
situations. To explore the “cr isis face”	of Runet this chapter  addresses a var iety of cr isis 
situations including ter ror attacks, natural disasters, political protests and international 
conflicts. Despite the diversity of these situations, an examination of the role of Runet in 
cr isis situations allows us to identify a number of common features of the Russian Internet 
space and the cr isis-related practices of Russian Internet users. To this end, this chapter  
examines the role that Runet plays in mediating the transition from everyday life to a 
cr isis and the constitution of the user ’s position in relation to cr isis situations. The 
common features of the Russian Internet in cr isis situations include: an increasing 
transparency around such situations and the shaping of a situational awareness; holding 
accountable the author ities in relation to how to they manage emergency responses; 
suppor t for var ious forms of user par ticipation in cr isis-related activities and the cr isis-
related mobilisation of user resources. In addition, this chapter  demonstrates how cr isis 
situations can be considered as both moments of accelerated innovation and as moments 
for the accelerated development of new forms of control. The role of Runet in cr isis 
situations is explored in the context of the structure of power relations between state and 
citizens, and the specific role of cr isis situations in Russian history and Russian political 
culture. 
Key words: emergency response, crowdsourcing, cr isis communication, media and 
conflicts, socio-political innovation 
 
Introduction 
 
While the Wor ld Wide Web is a relatively recent invention, some scholars and wr iters 
had already envisioned networked structures that linked people together  many years 
pr ior  to the r ise of the Internet. One ear ly model of the Internet can be found in the novel 
“Timur  and His Squad” (1940) by the Soviet wr iter  Arkady Gaidar . Gaidar  descr ibes a 
vigilante group of children who in secret under take to do a char itable activity and protect 
their  fellow villagers from local hooligans. The secret headquar ters of their  organisation 
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is in an old barn at the centre of which is a steer ing wheel linked through a network of 
str ings to the houses of all members of this secret organisation. Whenever  Timur , the 
leader  of the squad, needs his team, he uses the wheel to call them. The number  of times 
he turns the steer ing wheel indicates the different types of aler t or  calls for  help. Str ings 
can also be connected to or  disconnected from the wheel in order  to call on specific 
members of the network. The wheel is a tool that allows targeted mobilisation of the 
resources of a distr ibuted network in a cr isis situation of. Using the wheel both defines 
the cr isis and addresses it. It also constitutes the nature of the informal network of 
Timur’s squad. To what extent, we may ask, does Runet embody Gaidar ’s networked 
mobilisation wheel vis-à-vis their  respective capacity to response to emergency 
situations?  
Research on the Internet, and specifically Runet, has addressed a broad range of 
issues including the economy, digital literacy and the digital divide, regulation, media, 
secur ity, politics, social movements and games. While all these topics appear  diverse, most 
of them share a common denominator . They each deal with issues that are related to the 
everyday life of users. However , there is one issue which is distinctively different from 
everyday life: cr isis situations. The purpose of this chapter  is to explore the role of Runet 
in cr isis situations.  To address this issue, we fir st need to define the term ‘cr isis’ and how 
to conceptualise the role of digital platforms in cr isis situations. 
 
1. Role of digital platforms in cr isis situations 
 
There is an ongoing discussion about the notion of cr isis (Coombs, 2010). Seeger  et al. 
(2003) propose that “a cr isis may be defined as a specific, unexpected, non-routine event 
or  ser ies of events that creates high levels of uncer tainty and a significant or  perceived 
threat to high pr ior ity goals” (cited in Sellnow & Seeger , 2010, p.7). Rosenthal and 
Kouzmin (1993) distinguish between intentional man-made cr ises and natural external 
causes. Lerbinger  (1997) distinguishes between “cr ises of the physical wor ld” (e.g. natural 
disasters), cr ises of the “human climate” (e.g. cr iminal actions and political conflicts) and 
“cr ises attr ibutable to management failure” (pp.15-16). James and Wooten (2005) offer  
typology that relies on differentiation between sudden and smoulder ing cr ises. According 
to them, natural disasters, ter ror  attacks, explosions, and technological incidents can be 
considered as unexpected sudden cr isis situations. Weick (1993) addresses a cr isis as a 
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cosmological episode, where “people suddenly and deeply feel that the universe is no 
longer  a rational, order ly system” (p.633).  
The notion of cr isis, however , cannot be distinguished from people’s behavioural 
changes in response to a cr isis. Sellnow & Seeger  (2013) point out that “When people 
believe there is a cr isis, they are likely to behave differently than they would in so-called 
normal times” (p.5). According to Bar ton (1969), the transformation of society in the face 
of cr isis can be conceptualised as a transition from an everyday-life social system to an 
“emergency social system”, suggesting an alternative normative structure, behaviour  and 
set of roles that are formed around the need to address the cr isis and resolve it “either  by 
star ting new activities to meet people’s needs or  by inducing people to accept a lower  
standard of goal achievement” (p.66). This may include polar  forms of behaviour  
including a significant r ise of altruism or  the opposite, anti-social and violent behaviour  
(Sorokin, 1943; Bar ton, 1969). According to chaos theory, cr isis opens up a space for  new 
forms of self-organisation and is necessary for  evolution to a higher  order  (Sellnow & 
Seeger , 2013, p.110). Solnit (2010) suggests that cr isis presents a window of oppor tunity 
in which new types of society, dr iven by altruism, can be introduced. Emergency 
situations can be also approached as moments of technological innovation and socio-
political development, dr iven as they are by the need to address the cr isis (Cuny, 1983).  
From an informational point of view, a cr isis can be considered as the 
“production of uncer tainty” (Sellnow & Seeger  2013, p.258). Flows of communication 
around cr ises can both diminish uncer tainty as well as increase a degree of confusion and 
mistrust. One of the central issues in cr isis communication is the cause of the cr isis and 
who needs to be held accountable for  it (Coombs & Holladay, 2004). At the same time, 
communication also has an instrumental dimension and can provide instruction on how 
to survive and how to address the cr isis. However , communication is not only the process 
of information provision about a specific cr isis, it also constitutes the core process in 
constructing the cr isis: “Defining an issue as a cr isis means that some action must be 
taken in response and that resources should be made available” (Sellnow & Seeger  2013, 
p.10). 
The link between the construction of the cr isis and the mobilisation of resources 
to respond to the cr isis highlights the broad role of digital technologies in cr isis situations. 
The role of digital platforms and social networks in cr isis situations is not limited to 
increasing transparency around these situations, the attr ibution of responsibility for  
them and holding someone accountable. Var ious forms of crowdsourcing practices have 
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the potential to allow the resources of digital users to be mobilised to respond to a cr isis 
(Asmolov, 2014; Meier , 2015). While the availability of big data (Castillo, 2016) and user -
generated information contr ibute to the capacity to construct the cr isis, crowdsourcing 
practices suppor t var ious types of online and offline activity that can be considered par t 
of an emergency response (Meier , 2011; Ziemke, 2012).  
In this way, the role of digital technologies for  defining what cr isis is and for  the 
facilitation of emergency response are inter related. Digital technologies play a dual role 
while they mediate meaning (Silverstone, 2002) as a par t of the cr isis construction, and 
mediate activity (Vygotsky, 1978; Leontiev, 1979) as a par t of the cr isis response. In that 
sense, the role of digital platforms and the Internet in par ticular  can be approached as a 
mediator  between users and cr isis situations. Var ious forms of digital mediation 
constitute the position of users in regard to a cr isis either  as passive spectators of the cr isis 
or  active par ticipants in the emergency response. The mediational perspective on 
technologies (Kaptelinin, 2014) suggests that we’re asking about mediation oppor tunities 
that could offer  new forms of relationship between user and cr isis. The role of digital 
platforms in the mediation of the user -cr isis relationship can, however , differ  depending 
on the cultural and socio-political context.  
In some cases, digital platforms mediate collaboration between traditional 
institutions and Internet users. In other  cases, the digitally mediated mobilisation of 
citizens’ resources addresses traditional institutions’ lack of appropr iate emergency 
response. The latter  makes any type of cr isis, including natural disaster , a sensitive 
political issue. Pelling and Dill (2006, pp.4-5) suggest that “the failure of the state to 
respond adequately to disaster  can create a temporary power  vacuum” and call for  
“opening to scrutiny dominant political and institutional systems”. Hewitt (1998) 
highlights that in situations of natural disaster , one of the major  goals of emergency 
management by the author ities is to control the population in affected areas rather  than 
to respond to the disaster . In that context, traditional institutions also seek to use the 
media to construct the cr isis either , that is, to avoid cr iticism and responsibility, and/ or  
to legitimise action that is more radical than that which is considered acceptable in the 
context of everyday life.  
In that light, digital affordances (Hutchby, 2001) and mediational oppor tunities 
for  the mobilisation of the digital crowd’s resources, as well as users’ par ticipation in 
cr isis-related activities can be interpreted and realised in substantially different ways in 
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different socio-political and cultural contexts. In other  words, similar  tools can play a 
substantially different role in the construction of meaning around cr isis, offer  different 
modes of relationship between citizens and traditional state institutions as well as 
introduce different types of cr isis-related activity systems (Engeström, 1987). Therefore, 
investigation of the role of digital platforms for  cr isis communication requires not only 
interdisciplinary but also intercultural comparative projects, which cross the borders of 
national states (Schwarz et al., 2016).  
 
As such, this study concentrates on a specific segment of global cyberspace – 
Runet. A focus on the Russian Internet, also known as Runet, provides us with a specific 
case for  examining the role of a national segment of the Wor ld Wide Web in situations of 
cr isis. The notion of Runet requires fur ther  clar ification. As argued by Schmidt & 
Teubener  (2006) the boundar ies of Runet may rely on a var iety of factors including 
“language, technology, ter r itory, cultural norms, traditions or  values and political 
power” (p.14). In this chapter  Runet is addressed as a socio-cultural segment of 
cyberspace that is dominated by Russian language content and Russian language social 
interaction and open to Russian-speaking users from all over  the wor ld. However , the 
notion that Runet as a dedicated term for  a specific segment of cyber  space “has almost 
no analogue in Western languages” (Schmidt & Teubener  2006, p. 14) also requires 
specific attention. “Runet” as a concept can also be considered as an object of continuous 
social construction and accordingly, a set of dominant and alternative Internet 
imaginar ies of the information environment that are promoted by different actors who 
belong to the Russian scientific, technological, cultural, media and political elites 
(Asmolov & Kolozar idi, 2017). 
This chapter  is focused on explor ing the role of Runet in the mediation of 
meanings and the mediation of activities around cr isis situations. It asks “What role does 
Runet play in the construction of cr isis and in cr isis response par ticipation”?  New forms 
of digital mediation of user -cr isis relationships are explored as a manifestation of digital 
innovation that seek to address cr isis related challenges. The role of digital innovation is 
addressed in terms of how digital platforms that have been used by Runet users constitute 
their  position in regard to cr isis situations. In addition, digital innovation is also explored 
in the context of relationships between Internet users and traditional institutions that are 
responsible for  cr isis response. Finally, responding to the above questions may assist in 
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the examination of how digital innovation in cr isis situation can be associated with the 
development of Runet in everyday life.  
 
2. Russia and cr isis situations: a socio-political context 
 
Russian history includes key episodes when natural disasters had political consequences. 
For  instance, famine and fires in what is called the “Time of Troubles” (“Smutnoe 
vremya”) number  among the factors linked to political instability dur ing the regency of 
Bor is Godunov (1601-1603). Alexander  Pushkin (1825) descr ibed Godunov’s frustration 
about the people’s lack of appreciation for  his actions in response to the cr isis: “They 
blamed me for the fire! Such is the mob”. According to Bar ton (1969), “In nineteenth-
century Russia the overcentralisation of power  by the Tsar  left local government so weak 
and unpopular  that its effor ts to control a disaster  led to r iots, and there was massive 
disobedience” (p.293). That said, in the 19th century volunteer  firefighters “consistently 
suppor ted the traditional values of an author itar ian state” (Raab, 2011, p.4). In the USSR, 
the author ities made a significant effor t to conceal information about disasters, as in the 
case of the nuclear  explosion in Chernobyl which was addressed by the state with a 
“politics of invisibility” (Kuchinskaya, 2014). Samoilenko (2016) argues that blame 
games, shifting responsibility and concealing cr ises are traditional practices for  Russian 
institutional actors which can be approached as a legacy of Soviet totalitar ian practice in 
which the state plays a dual role as both “cr isis manager” and as “r isk producer” (p.406). 
Roffey (2014) argues that concealment of the “real magnitude of the problem” can often 
be seen in Russia: 
 
There is a r isk that a natural disaster  and the cr ises it generates will undermine 
the influence and legitimacy of key actors and leaders. Controlling the flow of 
information to the public is therefore seen as essential. (Roffey, 2014, p.79) 
 
Ber trand (2012) also points out that dur ing the wildfires of 2010 the government 
sought “to hush up the role played dur ing the emergency phase by a large and 
spontaneous organisation of citizens” to allow the government “to construct an image of 
a capable state and leaders to prevent any loss of credibility at the national and 
international levels” (p.39). 
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To explore the role of Runet in cr isis situations this chapter  suggests focusing on 
three types of emergency. The fir st type of cr isis is major  incidents and ter ror  attacks. 
The second type of cr isis are natural disasters; the chapter  looks specifically into the role 
of Runet in response to wildfires in 2010. Finally, some additional aspects of the role of 
Runet in cr isis situations are explored through a focus on domestic and international 
conflicts. That includes internal political unrest, specifically protests around the 
par liamentary and presidential elections of 2011-2012 and international conflicts, 
specifically the conflict between Russian and Ukraine. All three situations offer  an 
oppor tunity to examine the role of Runet in its transition from everyday life to 
emergency-related social systems and the var ious modes of digitally mediated user -cr isis 
relationship that are linked to this transition. 
 
3. The role of Runet in the constitution of the user ’s position in cr isis 
situations 
 
1.1.   Major incidents, terror attacks and alternative sources of data 
 
One of the major  character istics of cr isis situations is a contradiction between a scarcity 
of information and the immediate demand of the public to know what is happening. This 
contradiction may become even more significant in political environments in which the 
major  traditional media are controlled by government, and where there is some degree 
of mistrust in the information that is distr ibuted through official media. Even before 
Runet became known as Runet, it provided sources of independent information about 
cr isis events. For  instance, dur ing the Putsch events of August 1991, UseNet newsgroups 
were used by members of the Relcom and Demos networks to share information about 
what had happened in Moscow (Soldatov & Borogan, 2015). 
Runet star ted to play a role as an alternative source of information at the time of 
several major ter ror attacks in the fir st half of the 2000s, when state-controlled TV 
channels were increasingly cr iticised for censor ing essential information about cr isis 
situations (Lipman, 2006). These included the hostage taking dur ing the Nord-Ost 
musical in Moscow (2002) and in a school in Beslan (2004) (Peterson, 2005, p.79).  
Independent online media were the central source of information at these times. That 
said, information was also circulating via Runet, mostly in the Livejournal blogosphere, 
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a popular platform in the mid-2000s. One of the reasons for the blogs’ increasing role was 
that a number of well-known journalists used Livejournal for personal blogging in 
addition to repor ting to their  media organisations. In some cases, fir st-hand information 
was also published by eye-witnesses and relatives of the hostages. The role of Runet at the 
time of the ter ror attacks was not limited to Russia.  Israeli Russian-speaking users of 
Livejournal created a dedicated online community, “Pereklichka_il” (roll-call), to check 
the safety of bloggers following ter ror attacks in Israeli cities3. This community can be 
considered as an ear ly prototype of Facebook’s safety check application.  
User-generated content came to play a par ticular ly significant role when an 
incident took place in a highly-populated environment. For instance, a fire in a tall 
building in the Setunsky neighbourhood of Moscow in November 2005, when eye 
witnesses from the sur rounding buildings shared photos online in real-time. Information 
generated by the users of Runet, including bloggers and members of local forums, often 
offered fir st-hand information about emergency situations almost in real time in a 
number  of incidents and ter ror  attacks, par ticular ly when the event took place in an 
urban area or  in proximity to a substantial number  of Internet users who were able to 
document and share information about the incident using their  personal computers and 
mobile phones. This included the crash of a Boeing in Perm in 2008, a ter ror  attack on 
the “Nevsky Express” train in November  2009 (Asmolov 2009a) and a fire in the 
“Khromaya Lochad” club in Perm (Asmolov, 2009b).  Groups dedicated to these incidents 
were created on social networks such as Vkontakte and these were used for  shar ing 
information about what had happened. User -generated online content about the incidents 
also star ted to be actively used by traditional media.  
Another  practice that emerged in the context of the coverage of major  incidents 
and ter ror  attacks was the memor isation of the personal pages of the victims. For  
instance, a number  of the passengers and flight attendants who tragically died in the 
aforementioned 2008 Boeing crash had personal webpages on the popular  social network 
Vkontakte. Following the tragedy, dozens of users left comments with condolences on the 
personal profiles. These profiles were also used as a source of information by traditional 
media.  
With the growing popular ity of Twitter  in Russia, substantial coverage of 
incidents star ted to circulate with hashtags. Hashtags enable the emergence of a common 
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denominator for a feed of information around specific events. Moreover, while some 
hashtags refer red directly to an event (e.g. #Domoded24 in the case of a ter ror attack on 
Domodedovo airpor t or  #Metro29 in that of the ter ror attack on the Russian 
underground), other hashtags refer red to specific aspects or forms of activity related to 
the event, for  instance those that helped people in the area of the incident to find 
alternative free transpor t. Twitter  also contr ibuted to the rapid proliferation of 
information through its simple reposting feature.   
Social media gradually became a legitimate source of information for traditional 
media. It also challenged the state’s framing of and nar rative around the scale of the 
incident and the efficiency of the response. That said, multiple sources of information 
online also contr ibuted to an information over load, a lack of clear and consistent pictures 
of the events, and they also increased the threat of the proliferation of unver ified 
information and rumours. In response to this challenge, users of Runet introduced a new 
bottom-up practice that allowed ver ified information from social media and traditional 
media to be gathered in the same place. This is the practice of the development of ad hoc 
websites that appear  in the fir st hours after  an event to aggregate — in one and the same 
place — information from a var iety of sources. One of the fir st websites of this type 
Vlfire.org was set up in response to a fire that had occur red in an office building in 
Vladivostok (2006). The website was also used to hold the local author ities accountable 
following the incident.    
In some cases, an ad hoc project would be named after  the hashtags given to the 
event on Twitter. For instance, a few hours after  the ter ror  attack on the Moscow 
underground on March 29, 2010, the webpage metro29.ru was set up to aggregate 
information about the tragedy. A similar  type of ad-hoc website was developed dur ing 
the 2011 ter ror ist attack on Domodedovo airpor t. The platform Domoded24.com “served 
as a source for  essential information, such as names of casualties and wounded as well as 
lists of volunteer  dr ivers” (Machleder  & Asmolov, 2011). The role of these ad-hoc 
websites and social media platforms went beyond providing an alternative source of 
information and contradicting the official media frames. It constituted the position of 
users in regard to cr isis not only as information sources, but also a resource that can be 
mobilised to show mutual aid and assist those affected by the cr isis. The full spectrum of 
Runet’s functions in cr isis situations can be explored through addressing emergencies 
which have a broader  geographical scope and which continue over  a longer  per iod of 
time. This requires focusing on and examining responses to natural disasters.  
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1.2.   Natural disasters and crowdsourcing 
 
In summer  2010 wildfires broke out in different locations in Western Russia. More than 
60 people died, and the unofficial number  of casualties was higher . Hundreds of buildings 
burned down. Moscow was covered by smog and millions of people in the Russian capital 
struggled to have access to fresh air . The wildfires in Russia took place a few months after  
a tragic ear thquake in Haiti, an incident that had tr iggered a wave of innovation around 
cr isis mapping and digital innovation. Some of the technologies that had been used in 
response to the Haiti ear thquake could be also seen used in response to Russia’s wildfires. 
Fir st, the Russian Internet was actively used to map disaster  and collect 
volunteer - based geographic information (VGI) about the emergency (the notion of VGI 
was introduced by Goodchild (2007)). This included the active par ticipation of GIS 
exper ts, open data activists and members of the Open Street Map community. Some fire-
mapping activities were suppor ted by environmental organisations such as Greenpeace 
and the satellite monitor ing company Scanex. A map of fires was developed by Yandex 
(http://pozhar.yandex.ru). The “Kosmosnimki” company, which is linked to Scanex, 
developed the platform “Fires” (http://fires.kosmosnimki.ru  which later  became fires.ru) 
for  the global mapping of wildfires. More generally, the data about fires came from 
var ious sources including user -generated information on social media (including 
Facebook, Livejournal, YouTube, etc.) as well as from satellite imagery. Internet-based 
fire mapping sought to offer  real-time information about the spread of fires in different 
locations in Russia.  
These cr isis mapping effor ts were par ticular ly impor tant due to some Russian 
Internet users’ mistrust of official information about the scale of the fires. While the 
traditional media repor ted that the emergency services had the wildfires under  control, 
digitally mediated effor ts to independently map the fires provided an alternative picture 
of the scale of the disaster . In that sense, cr isis mapping went beyond the instrumental 
mapping of disaster , and it can be considered a source of alternative framing of the 
disaster  (Entman, 1993), one that challenges the author ities’ control over  the construction 
of the information picture around wildfires. The role of user -generated information in 
the case of Russian fires, however , was not limited to creating a database of open data 
about disaster  and cr isis mapping. The role of user -dr iven cr isis mapping was also not 
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limited to alternative framing and exposing the real scale of the disaster . As highlighted 
by Morozova and Miroshnechenko (2011), the role of online networked communities 
went beyond information exchange and it “initiated citizen par ticipation in real life 
events” (p. 148). 
The information that was collected by users included the humanitar ian needs of 
the wildfire victims as well as requests for  the immediate mobilisation of volunteers to 
fight the fires. A par ticular ly significant role was played by the blogging platform 
Livejournal. One of the fir st repor ts about the wildfires was provided by Michail 
Shlyapnikov, a blogger  who lived near  a village that was almost destroyed by the fire. 
This repor t was distr ibuted promptly through social networks and it mobilised other  
bloggers to take par t in the collection of var ious goods to help victims. A dedicated 
Livejournal-based community, Pozar_Ru (http://community.livejournal.com/pozar_ru/) 
was launched to offer  a common channel of communication and a coordination of 
response to the wildfires. Some bloggers, including journalist Igor  Chersky, went to the 
areas affected by the fires to gather  fir st-hand information about real needs. The help 
that was provided by Internet users included not only food and clothing, but also 
professional firefighting equipment that had been purchased by the users. Runet star ted 
to play a vital role in the mobilisation of resources that are needed to respond to a disaster  
and in the engagement of volunteers, as a par t of the emergency response.  
Russian users never theless faced a major  challenge. A constant flow of 
information about fires and needs requires an efficient platform for  cr isis mapping, one 
that can aggregate information about fires, information about needs, and information 
about available resources offered by Internet users. In addition, there is a need for  an 
advanced mechanism to coordinate resource allocation, as well as for  to organise 
volunteer ing activities. One response to these challenges was provided by those who relied 
on the crowdsourcing platform Ushahidi, which had been used a few months ear lier  in 
response to an ear thquake in Haiti. The crowdsourcing platform “Help Map” (Russian-
fires.ru) offered to connect those who needed help with those who could offer  assistance, 
relying on a permanent aggregation of data about fires, needs, and resources. In addition 
to online platforms, “Help Map” offered an offline volunteer -based coordination centre 
for  fire response. The platform also suppor ted synergy between users and different NGOs 
including the official char ity organisation of the Russian Church.  
Data from the “Help Map” was also integrated within the map of fires that had 
been developed by Yandex, which constitutes an example of cross-platform collaboration 
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between a major  Internet company and an independent citizen-dr iven online initiative. 
The capacity of digital platforms to suppor t alternative top down systems of emergency 
response coordination relies not only on the generation of user -generated data, but also 
of user -generated meta-data. “Help Map” and other  crowdsourcing platforms, as well as 
Twitter , allow users to generate new categor ies and tags, which suppor t the development 
of an alternative system of cr isis classification.  The development of a structure of 
categor ies that is dr iven by users can be addressed as the folksonomy of emergency 
situations (Asmolov, 2015a). 
The development of “Help map” highlighted the fact that Russian Internet users 
had taken a step forward, moving from a var iety of initiatives and a general willingness 
to volunteer  to a user -coordinated emergency response operation. According to 
Morozova and Miroshnechenko (2011), “The ‘Help Map’ project is an example of an ‘ad 
hoc’ electronic resource developed by a networked community in emergency situations” 
(p. 148).  In just a few days “Help Map” was visited by more than 100,000 users and 
attracted the attention of the mass media. According to Meier  (2015), “Help Map” was 
also one of the biggest Ushahidi deployments wor ldwide at that time. Later , it received 
an Runet Award, a national award sponsored by the Russian Ministry of 
Communication, as the best Internet project of the year  in the ‘State and Society’ 
category, and several other  pr izes. The project was also one of the fir st significant 
crowdsourcing initiatives in the history of Runet. 
Scholars highlight that “citizen-dr iven ad hoc electronic resources are a type of 
project that emerges when the state’s structures are not capable of reacting to new issues 
that are thrown up by emergency situations” (Morozova & Miroshnichenko, 2011, p.148). 
According to Yanitzky (2010, online), the role of social media in response to the wildfires 
in 2010 highlights that “the network systems not only per formed faster  and more flexibly 
in the mobilisation of resources, and in a way that is not available for  mobilisation 
through ‘ver tical structures’ of political and social action, but they also provided more 
reliable information, which also included ear ly warnings about cr itical situations that 
were developing on the ground”. Yanitzky also suggests that the way social media were 
used in response to wildfires bears a resemblance to Kropotkin’s concept of mutual aid, 
which highlights that cooperation is not possible without trust.  
The role of Runet in response to wildfires can be conceptualised through a 
number  of contemporary concepts from social and political science. For  instance, the role 
of Runet users in response to wildfires can be addressed as a manifestation of var ious 
13 
13 
segments of networking power  (Castells, 2011), the mobilisation of the “fifth estate” 
(Dutton, 2009), and the emergence of networks of trust that suppor t digitally mediated 
mutual aid (Benkler , 2011). The role of Runet in the facilitation of emergency response 
in a socio-political context can be also explored using the concept of limited statehood 
(Risse, 2011; Livingston and Walter  Drop, 2014). The latter  would suggest that the users’ 
self-organisation that relies on digital platforms can be seen in situations where citizens 
believe that the state is not capable of providing an adequate emergency response: 
In an environment of low trust in government and other  institutions, 
interpersonal communication networks become tools for  coping with 
cr ises when public mechanisms for  effective communication fail. 
Ordinary Russians develop their  own unique strategies of 
communication and pragmatic competence to survive and maintain 
control over  their  environment. (Samoilenko 2016, p. 406).   
In that light, the practices that were developed by Runet users in response to wildfires 
can be seen as an alternative user -dr iven mode of governance for  an emergency situation 
(Asmolov 2014). 
Traditional institutions including the Ministry of Emergency Response star ted 
to develop their  own online presence in January 2008, when the ministry launched an 
Internet por tal that dealt with emergency situations (Morozova and Miroshnichenko, 
2011, p, 149). One of the major  purposes of the state’s online presence is to broadcast 
aler ts about hazards and potential emergencies. That said, it seems that the state 
predominantly approaches Internet users as a passive audience that needs to be informed, 
rather  than as a potential par tner  for  collaboration. Morozova and Miroshnichenko 
(2011) highlight that they were not able to find any reference to the value of the resources 
of the networked community in any official or  informal documents produced by Russian 
emergency response institutions. According to these wr iters “Ignor ing the constructive 
potential [of networked communities] is a consequence of the rejection of Internet users 
as ‘Aliens’ due to their  non-conformism and cr iticism of the author ities” (pp. 149-150).  
This notion of consider ing Internet users as ‘aliens’ gave r ise to several different 
types of state-dr iven online policy. For  instance, in the case of wildfires some pro-
government youth movements allegedly used digital technologies to create a semblance 
of par ticipation in the emergency response through the dissemination of staged photos 
showing the putting out of fires (Asmolov, 2010). Another  way traditional state 
institutions addressed the role of digital platforms in emergency situations was by 
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developing a tool for  the management of volunteers.  The website Dobrovoletz.r f 
(Volunteer .Rf) was developed by RosSoyuzSpas, an organisation of emergency-related 
volunteers that was associated with the Ministry of Emergency Situations (MCHS). 
Unlike “Help Map” and var ious pages on social media that offered a hor izontal and 
transparent model for  the coordination of emergency response by users, Dobrovoletz.r f 
proposed a model based on a registry of volunteers that is managed hierarchically in a 
non-transparent way by RosSoyuzSpas administrators.  
The Dobrovoletz.r f platform highlighted the tension between the role of ICTs in 
the engagement of people in emergency response and controlling the resources of people 
in situations of cr isis. The model of a platform that is dr iven by an intent to control the 
resources of Internet users, rather  than to use these resources, has been conceptualised 
as “ver tical crowdsourcing” (Asmolov, 2015b). Another  major  tension can be seen 
around the state’s approach to the role of ICTs in an emergency with regard to user -
generated data. Apparently, there is a conflict between seeing data as something that 
contr ibutes to awareness of a situation and enables a suppor t response, and seeing data 
as a source of cr iticism which challenges the state’s monopoly over  the information 
picture of a disaster . The latter  transforms the state’s perspective on the role of social 
media from a resource that contr ibutes to emergency response to a resource that can be 
considered a reputational threat and that may have a negative impact on the institutional 
apparatus.  
Innovative forms of citizen use of digital platforms as well tension ar ising 
between volunteers reliant on digital platforms and traditional institutional structures 
again emerged two years after  the wildfires, this time in reaction to floods in the Krymsk 
area (2012). In 2013, in response to floods in Russia’s Far  East, a group of volunteers 
tr ied another  model of digitally mediated response due to the remoteness of the disaster  
from central Russia. The ad-hoc platform Amur13 was used by a small group of 
volunteers for  crowdfunding. The financial assistance that came from a broad group of 
Russian Internet users allowed goods to be purchased and sent to the few volunteers 
active in the disaster  area and distr ibuted to suppor t the affected local community and 
local responders.  
The role of platforms for  emergency response, however , has now gone beyond 
specific emergency situations. Digital platforms have contr ibuted to the development of 
networks of citizen resilience that allows people to be mobilised around emergency 
situations on an everyday basis. For  instance, “Liza Aler t”, a digital search and rescue 
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online group and platform, allows the immediate mobilisation of volunteers once there is 
a repor t that someone has gone missing (Asmolov, 2011). “Liza Aler t” volunteers, as well 
as members of a few additional search and rescue projects that use digital platforms for  
the mobilisation of volunteers and the coordination of searches (e.g. the Extremum group 
that is based in the Saint Petersburg area), illustrate how ICTs can help to save the lives 
of specific people in everyday life. One may suggest that emergency related digital online 
projects also inspire digital innovation in the sphere of urban and political activism, when 
crowdsourcing platforms star t to be used for  the mapping of urban problems and to 
facilitate citizen activism to resolve them.  For  instance, according to Russian political 
activist Alexey Navalny, the model of “Help Map” was used for  his fir st crowdsourcing 
project, which mapped potholes on roads (Navalny, 2010). This example suggests how 
innovation comes to be diffused, moving from cr isis-related activism to other  spheres of 
digitally mediated citizen par ticipation.  
Emergency response continues to be an area of constant digital innovation. That 
includes the development of algor ithms and AI applications to deal with the increasing 
size of big data sets around emergency situations. The response to the hur r icane that took 
place in Moscow in 2017 highlights that the development of efficient and targeted aler ting 
systems remains a challenge. While big Russian internet companies such as Yandex had 
developed new innovative forms of mapping that allowed hur r icanes and rainfall to be 
followed in real time, the state’s SMS-based aler ting system was accused of being late and 
providing information that was neither  instrumental nor  helpful to people in the affected 
areas.  
To sum up, the case of Runet demonstrates how in emergency situations digital 
innovation has not only contr ibuted to people’s increased situational awareness, but also 
challenged the state-sponsored framing of the emergency.  Fur thermore, digital mapping 
has provided actionable data that suppor ts the mobilisation of users’ resources and the 
coordination of user  dr iven response. This analysis illustrates the role of Runet in 
increasing transparency around emergency situations, in suppor ting effor ts to hold state 
institutions accountable in order  to improve their  emergency response, and in facilitating 
the self-organisation of Internet users to respond to the emergency. It also highlights the 
tension between institutions’ top-down effor ts to control the information picture of a 
disaster  and the volunteers and users’ bottom-up effor ts to provide an independent 
picture of the situation and allow the hor izontal mobilisation of the resources of the users 
by the users around goals that are defined by the users.   
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1.3.   Internal and external conflicts: participation and political 
innovation 
 
The third set of cr isis situations under  discussion is that of conflicts. The role of Runet in 
conflicts provokes the asking of several questions, including how digital platforms 
mediate the relationship between their  users and the conflicts, how relations between 
institutional actors and users are manifested in a conflict situation, and what the major  
forms of digital innovation are that are dr iven by conflict situations. Conflict can be 
divided into two main types of situations. The fir st type is that of internal political conflict, 
which includes conflict within a state such as citizen-dr iven protest against the 
author ities. The second type is that of external conflict, which includes cases of 
international conflict between state actors. 
Numerous scholars have explored the role of Runet in empower ing the Russian 
political opposition (Oates, 2013; Greene, 2014).  On the one hand, Runet can be 
considered as an alternative source of information which “offer [s] alternative frames for 
discussing news and politics” and “constitutes an independent alternative to broadcast 
and pr int media” (Alexanyan et al., 2012). On the other hand, Runet is used a platform 
for the mobilisation and self-organisation of people in situations of political protest.  
The protests following the par liamentary elections in winter 2011-2012 provide 
an illustration of the role of Runet in a context of political cr isis. The protests were 
suppor ted by the  development of var ious digital projects including platforms that 
suppor t new forms of data collection about electoral fraud (e.g. The Map of Electoral 
Violations by NGO Golos), independent tools for counting the number of par ticipants in 
protests (e.g. “The White Counter” tool), tools for the simplification of symbolic 
production and the shar ing of protest  related content, tools for the mobilisation and 
engagement of people for electoral monitor ing and par ticipation in demonstrations, 
including tools that allow new forms of decentralised connective action (Bennett & 
Segerberg, 2012) as in the case of the White Circle protest. In the latter  case, a dedicated 
platform (Feb26.ru) suppor ted the self-organisation of people enabling them to create a 
live chain around the centre of Moscow.  
Situations of internal cr isis can be considered moments of accelerated digital 
political innovation, when both sides of a conflict seek to develop technological solutions 
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to increase their  capacity to collect data and mobilise people as well as to neutralise the 
innovations that have been introduced by the opposite side (Asmolov, 2014). From this 
perspective, every new political cr isis presents a new cycle of digital innovation on both 
sides of the conflict. Digital innovation can also be viewed as something that can 
potentially change the balance of power between opposing sides of the conflict, though 
every shift of balance towards one side is answered by the other side with effor ts to restore 
the balance. For instance, the increasing role of Vkontakte social networking groups in 
the facilitation of a diversity of forms of par ticipation in protest activity was addressed 
by increasing pressure on the founder of the network, Pavel Durov, who in turn publicly 
refused to collaborate with the author ities. What star ted as a request from the Russian 
secur ity agencies for the disclosure of data from the pr ivate communications of Vkontakte 
users, ended with Vkontakte changing hands and Durov leaving Russia.  
The other type of conflict is that which goes beyond the borders of the state. The 
Internet is often considered as a space for information warfare between var ious state 
actors, in which digital platforms can be used both for propaganda and for 
infrastructural cyber-attacks against a r ival state and its citizens. That said, while 
focusing on international conflict as an additional type of cr isis in order to examine the 
role of Runet, it is par ticular ly fruitful to approach this type of conflict from the point of 
view of Internet users. This approach involves explor ing how digital platforms distinguish 
between everyday life and conflict through users’ immersion in the conflict and by 
offer ing users a set of roles in relation to the conflict.  
The conflict between Russia and Ukraine presents a distinctive case, since while 
it involves conflict between two independent sovereign states, many citizens of both 
countr ies share the same Russian-speaking internet space, and use the same digital 
platforms including social networking websites that were developed in Russia. The 
oppor tunity for immediate direct communication between users from both sides of the 
conflict potentially contr ibutes to the scale of its psychological tension and online hostility. 
Social networks integrated general information about the conflict with interpersonal 
interaction between users, which contr ibuted to immersion within the conflict even if the 
users were remote from the location of conflict. The latter  can potentially lead to the 
destruction of existent social ties, e.g. large scale ‘unfr iending’ practices when people 
decide to cut their  ties on social networking platforms due to the political positions of 
their  fr iends (Asmolov, 2018). The destruction of social ties suppor ted by the proliferation 
of trolling practices as well as a flow of disinformation contr ibutes to the scale of online 
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aggression. That type of communication not only follows the conflict, but also constitutes 
the conflict by changing the social structure of the societies that have been involved in 
that conflict.  
As with situations of internal cr isis, international conflicts give r ise to var ious 
conflict mapping tools and platforms that provide information about the conflict from 
both sides. Moreover, dedicated platforms and crowdsourcing practices are used to ver ify 
information and challenge the credibility of the sources that are linked to the r ival side in 
the conflict. The collection of data relies not only on crowdsourcing, but also on the 
analysis of satellite imagery, as in the case of the repor ts that are developed by the Conflict 
Intelligence Team, a Russian online group of conflict investigators. The latter  can be 
considered as practices of Open Source Intelligence analysis that have been adopted by 
var ious actors to investigate conflicts. Data collection, together with its proliferation and 
ver ification, can be considered as a form of user-engagement in conflict-related activities.  
As well as in cases of natural disaster and internal political cr isis situations, 
international cr isis situations are also followed by digital innovation that enable var ious 
forms of user par ticipation in the conflict, which can be conceptualised as “par ticipatory 
warfare”. This includes par ticipation in information warfare when users from both sides 
are permitted to create content and disseminate content that represents the position of 
one of the sides. Some hacktivist projects allow the simplification of par ticipation in 
hacking activities for common users, when, for instance, users are able to contr ibute their  
computer resources to a botnet. Conflict mapping projects allow their  users to collect and 
share intelligence from the conflict zone, as well as take par t in data ver ification and data 
analysis that is also related to the conflict. Crowdfunding initiatives allow their  users to 
sponsor military activities, including taking par t in purchasing military equipment. 
Finally, some platforms are used for recruiting volunteers for offline par ticipation in the 
conflict.  
To sum up, digital innovation simplifies users’ par ticipation in conflict through 
offer ing a range of possible forms of activity in relation to warfare. As well as immersive 
practices, the par ticipatory practices can also be considered as something that constitutes 
the conflict through increasing the scope of social par ticipation in the conflict and making 
this conflict par t of everyday reality even in areas that are remote from the conflict. From 
this perspective, Runet has contr ibuted to the socialisation of conflict (Schattschneider , 
1975), which has increased the scope for par ticipation in conflict on both sides. In the case 
of both internal and international conflicts we can see that Runet has played a role not 
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only in the construction of different images of a given cr isis, but also in the mobilisation 
of users’ resources in relation to such cr ises.  
 
4. Conclusion 
 
This chapter  proposes that the Russian Internet has two different, though inter related, 
faces. The fir st face is that of Runet in everyday life. The second face is Runet in situations 
of cr isis. To explore the “cr isis side” of Runet, this chapter  has addressed a var iety of 
cr isis situations including ter ror attacks, natural disasters, political protests and 
international conflicts.  Despite the diversity of these situations, examination of the role 
of Runet in cr isis situations allows us to identify a number of common features of the 
Russian Internet space and the cr isis-related practices of Russian Internet users. Runet’s 
users generate cr isis-related data that contr ibutes to shaping a general picture of cr isis 
and situational awareness. That data increases the transparency around cr isis situations 
in cases when the state’s control over information flow seeks to diminish the scale of the 
emergency. The role of Runet in increasing transparency around a cr isis also contr ibutes 
to citizens’ capacity to hold the author ities accountable regarding their  management of 
the emergency response.  
 
In cr isis situations Runet reveals new faces in the digital crowd and new functions 
of digital sourcing. The role of user-generated data in exposing the scale of a cr isis and in 
providing information about specific needs allows users to go beyond passive 
spectatorship. The examination of natural disasters highlights that user-generated data 
can be considered as actionable data that suppor t actions by individual users as well as 
by NGOs. Runet offers a range of par ticipatory tools that mediate action and facilitate 
the self-organisation of individual users in a cr isis situation. From that perspective, one 
can argue that Runet appears to play an impor tant role in shaping the relations between 
users and cr isis situations, while offer ing diverse forms of potential action in relation to a 
given cr isis. In that sense, the role of Runet in constructing the picture of a cr isis and the 
mobilisation of users’ resources to address that cr isis are inter related. That is consistent 
with that double role of technological mediation as a mediation of meanings (Silverstone, 
2002) around specific situations and a mediation of activities (Kaptelinin, 2014) in regard 
to the constructed situation. 
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The case of Runet also illustrates how different types of cr isis situation serve as 
moments for innovation (Sellnow & Seeger  2013). This includes not only technological 
but also social-political innovation, that, as suggested by Solnit (2010), offer  a window of 
oppor tunity towards a new type of society. At the same time, while many features 
concerning the role of digital technology in the cr isis situations discussed here can be 
found in other countr ies, a number of aspects can be considered distinctive of Runet. A 
central aspect is related to the structure of power relations between state and citizens, and 
the specific role of cr isis situations in Russian history and Russian political culture over 
the last few hundred years. 
This chapter  illustrates that the role of Runet in cr isis situations is on the one 
hand a display of citizens’ mistrust towards author ities and citizens’ interest in 
developing an independent capacity to address cr ises. On the other hand, explor ing the 
role of Runet in cr isis situations illustrates the state’s interest in controlling the digital 
crowd, specifically the generation of content which threatens state control over the 
representation of a cr isis, as well as the state’s concern with the digitally mediated 
independent self-organisation of Internet users. From this perspective, Runet 
demonstrates that every type of cr isis, including natural disasters, political protest and 
international conflict, can be seen to generate tension between user-dr iven hor izontal 
mobilisation (e.g. the case of the “White Circle” platform and the “Help Map”) and state 
dr iven ver tical mobilisation (e.g. the case of Dobrovoletz.r f and initiatives for user 
engagement in information warfare) around the cr isis. The core of this tension is control 
over how the resources of the digital crowd are used in a cr isis situation, which includes 
symbolic resources for the construction of cr isis and a diversity of other resources that 
can be applied as par t of users’ engagement around а cr isis. In that context, the chapter  
demonstrates the vital role of Runet in both framing the cr isis and shaping the structure 
of the par ticipation of users in cr isis situations.  
The exploration of power relations cannot be separated, however, from the socio-
cultural context which focus on the examination of Runet’s role for normative and social 
transformation. This chapter  proposes that in the case of cr isis situations, Runet can be 
associated with the emergence of a cr isis-related social system, which relies on a different 
type of normative structure and offers new types of roles to Internet users. This includes 
the continuous effor ts of its users to collect actionable information about the real scale of 
the cr isis and the hor izontal coordination of mutual aid which relies on the mobilisation 
of the resources of the digital crowd. Runet plays a vital role in mediating the transition 
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from everyday life to cr isis, which is followed by change in the structure of social systems 
and the role of users. At the same time, projects like “Liza Aler ts” use digital platforms 
in order to continuously suppor t the construction of cr isis awareness as a par t of everyday 
life, and sustain cr isis-related normative modes of behaviour beyond large-scale cr isis 
situations. 
Finally, it may be argued that var ious types of emergencies seem to be a central 
dr iver in the development of Runet. This chapter  has demonstrated how cr isis situations 
can be considered as moments of accelerated innovation, when users develop new digital 
platforms and new digital practices including platforms for cr isis mapping and tools for 
the facilitation of collective action. For instance, crowdsourcing practices that were 
introduced dur ing the response to wildfires in 2010 were actively adapted later  in var ious 
fields including the struggle against cor ruption and urban activism. At the same time, 
situations of cr isis, including political protest, international conflict and natural disaster 
can also be considered to be moments for the accelerated development of new forms of 
control. Therefore, such tendencies as the sovereignisation and secur itisation of Runet 
may also have their  roots in specific cr isis situations that force institutional structures to 
address new political challenges.  
To conclude, this chapter  has shown that Runet indeed follows the vision of the 
“mobilising wheel” that was put forward by Arkady Gaidar . It takes par t in defining a 
given cr isis and suppor ting the mobilisation of people around that cr isis, while the act of 
mobilisation actually defines the situation as a crisis. It also constitutes the nature of the 
organisation of people around cr isis situations. At the same time, the questions that were 
focal in Gaidar ’s “wheel” remain so for  Runet as well: What are the rules that regulate 
how the “wheel” can be used, who is connected to the “wheel”, who has the r ight to turn 
the wheel so as to mobilise the network, and finally, is just any user  able to create and use 
his or  her  own “digital wheel”?  
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